报告题目：Banning Discriminatory Wholesale Pricing When Retailers Can Price Match?
报告人：蔡港树
时间及地点：6月19日10: 00-11:00 管经新大楼B312
邀请人：陈建清 长江学者
Abstract: This paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer's discriminatory wholesale pricing and the retailers' retail price matching guarantee. Our analysis shows that if the manufacturer follows a uniform wholesale pricing regime, then the price-matching prevails at equilibrium as it facilitates tacit collusion between the retailers. The increase in retail prices, resulting from the price-matching, hurts the manufacturer's profitability. If the manufacturer follows a discriminatory wholesale pricing regime, then price-matching does not prevail at equilibrium. Surprisingly, we find that a ban on wholesale price discrimination (e.g.,Robinson-Patman Act) reduces the supply chain efficiency and the consumer welfare by enabling tacit collusion between retailers via price-matching guarantees. This finding is in contrast with the findings of the extantliterature which shows that a ban on wholesale price discrimination can bewelfare improving when retailers cannot engage in price-matching. We show that our results are robust with respect to demand asymmetry and cost asymmetry between retailers, as well as information heterogeneity among customers.
个人简介：蔡港树博士，美国圣塔克拉拉大学终身正教授，东北财经大学国际商学院海外院长，现代供应链管理研究院院长，上海市“千人计划”专家，国家自然科学基金海外杰出青年基金获得者。主要研究方向是电子商务、多渠道供应链管理、供应链金融等领域。在国际顶级及权威期刊上发表论文30多篇。主持过美国国家科学基金、中国国家自然科学基金等各类科研项目20余项。荣获过国际电子商务大会最佳论文奖，堪萨斯州立大学商学院杰出教学和杰出研究奖，圣塔克拉拉大学的院长卓越教学、卓越研究、和卓越服务奖，利威商学院最高影响力教学奖及最高影响力服务奖，Decision Sciences杰出副主编奖，和国际市场与运营管理协会Skinner教学创新奖。现为国际顶级期刊Production and Operations Management资深编辑、权威期刊Decision Sciences副主编。
